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Dedicated to Odo Diekmann on the occasion of his 65th birthday. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Part of the art of theory building is to construct effective basic concepts, with a large 
reach and yet powerful as tools for getting at conclusions. The most basic concept of 
population biology is that of individual. An appropriately reengineered form of this 
concept has become the basis for the theories of structured populations and adaptive 
dynamics. By appropriately delimiting individuals, followed by defining their states 
as well as their environment, it become possible to construct the general population 
equations that were introduced and studied by Odo Diekmann and his collaborators. 
In this essay I argue for taking the properties that led to these successes as the 
defining characteristics of the concept of individual, delegating the properties 
classically invoked by philosophers to the secondary role of possible empirical 
indicators for the presence of those characteristics. The essay starts with putting in 
place as rule for effective concept engineering that one should go for relations that can 
be used as basis for deductive structure building rather than for perceived ontological 
essence. By analysing how we want to use it in the mathematical arguments I then 
build up a concept of individual, first for use in population dynamical considerations 
and then for use in evolutionary ones. These two concepts do not coincide, and neither 
do they on all occasions agree with common intuition-based usage. 
 
 
 
Key words:  concept engineering; individual; conditional independence; structured 
populations; meso-evolution 
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1. Introduction 
 
As a birthday present for Odo Diekmann I in this note put the spotlight on a key idea 
in our many years of collaboration (in the year of his 65th birthday precisely 40 
(Diekmann 1978, p. 9)). It is written in the form of a philosophical essay, explicating 
some intuitions that underlie the mathematical theories of physiologically structured 
populations and adaptive dynamics. I have chosen this form since I wanted to push 
those intuitions as far as possible, and possibly even a little further so that the 
alienating effect may catalyse a change in perspective.  
 The ideas put forward below derive from a number of different sources. For 
me it all started with being introduced to the state concept by a popular text on 
cybernetics by the psychiatrist, W. Ross Ashby (1956). At the time this felt like a 
revelation. Zadeh and Desoer (1963) and Kalman et al. (1969) later added 
mathematical depth. Further revelations came from being introduced to the Markov 
property and renewal points by Feller (1950) and to general age dependent branching 
processes by Jagers (1975). Finally, I got exposed to the art of building mathematical 
concepts by Steiner (1964), and to its philosophical and biological counterparts by 
Russel (1940) and Boche´nski and Menne (1965) respectively Woodger (1937, 1939, 
1952). 
The essay below deals with a classical problem in the philosophy of biology, 
the concept of individual. Most philosophical thinking on the topic takes a primarily 
ontological stand, trying to define individuals in terms of the physical properties of 
objects that may or may not be classified as such, expressed as single argument 
predicates. In my perspective, it is far more important how the concept functions as 
tool in biological arguments. There it matters less what individuals are, than how the 
presumed individuals occur in relational statements, i.e., more term predicates. An 
analogy may be found in geometry: mathematicians don’t care what points or lines 
are, as long as they are objects such that through two points “passes” a unique line 
and two lines “intersect” either in a unique point or not at all, in which case they are 
called parallel.  From this perspective it turns out that the crucial property of 
individuals is that they satisfy some, restricted, independence conditions. This 
independence can be engineered by a proper mental construction of (i) the state of an 
individual, (ii) its environment, on which we then can condition. This construction 
laid the foundations for the theory of physiologically structured populations and its 
derived theory of adaptive dynamics, as expounded in i.a. Metz and Diekmann 
(1986), Diekmann et al. (1990, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2010), Metz and de Roos (1992), 
Metz et al. (2000) respectively Metz et al. (1992, 1996), Geritz et al. (1998), 
Diekmann (2004), Durinx et al. (2008), Metz (2012). The earlier ontological 
perspective then becomes transformed into the pragmatics of constructing proper 
semantics, tying the mathematical constructs to reality.  
 
2. Preamble 
 
2.1. My philosophical stance  
Concepts are not god-given, but human constructs. In natural discourse their 
construction happens largely subconsciously, in hindsight referred to as “natural 
intuition”. This intuition comes in the form of “subconscious pre-concepts”. Those 
pre-concepts derive from evolved mechanisms that in interaction with the world 
around us shape our neural development (seen here as including learning, as when a 
baby develops its sense of a three dimensional world by experimenting with 
movement, all the while relating the results of this movement to tactile and visual 
perception). In scientific discourse the constructions are (sometimes) explicit, 
although necessarily initially based on natural discourse precursors. Natural discourse 
concepts, and the scientific ones based on them, often do a good job in matters related 
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to our daily functioning, but there is no reason to trust our intuition about further 
extensions. 
Although natural intuition may give us a head start in constructing scientific 
concepts, the ultimate criterion is not whether these concepts agree with intuition, but 
whether they do a good job in constructing scientific arguments. 
 
Metarule:  
Scientific concepts have to be judged in a forward-looking manner, 
based on their effectiveness as tools, not backward looking based on 
their agreement with historical precursors  
 
(the latter variously referred to as “established tradition”, “common knowledge”, or 
disguised as “didactical value”). 
 
2.2. Concept engineering 
What matters for letting arguments run smoothly is not so much what things “are” as 
how they relate to other “things”, occurring in the sort of arguments that we are after. 
A derived rule is that  
 
(1) it usually pays first to consider the structural embedding and only 
after that to worry about the semantics  
 
(i.e., the interpretation rules in terms of our observational possibilities).  
A second derived rule is that  
 
(2) we should be explicit about our scientific goals. 
 
A single concept from natural discourse may have different scientific extensions 
depending on the context, as defined by what sort of argument we are after. 
This goal directedness may seem to clash with rule (1) as scientific goals are 
often formulated in terms of a semantics. The solution is, as usual, to proceed by trial 
and error (as in the hypothetico-deductive method). 
 
2.3. My guiding example 
Mathematics is the science of rigorously delineated conceptual structures. Its basic 
concepts are structurally defined by their relations, codified in axioms. Axiom 
systems took form only slowly, guided by their effectiveness for deriving useful 
results. This usefulness was initially judged largely externally, by semantics 
connecting the derived results to the observational world, but nowadays more often 
internally, by 
 
•  mapping one mathematical structure into another one,  
•  interpreting a mathematical structure as abstracting the essentials of 
some  
less abstract ones (with the least abstract structures relating more 
directly to natural intuition), or, more rigorously, 
• deriving the structure through a limit from another one (which is usually  
 more directly interpretable), 
•  etc. 
 
2.4. Science: rigorous arguments and fuzzy semantics 
In science, as elsewhere, it is also a good idea to keep structural arguments clean, 
pertaining to an idealised world, and put any necessary fuzz in the semantics, 
replacing “=” with “approximates” or “roughly equals”, etc. For arguments are settled 
best by keeping a clear view of the distinction between structure and interpretation, 
keeping deductive arguments rigorous, and considering the links between theory, 
intuition and observation separately.  
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Most theoretical progress in biology increases the complexity of the structure so 
as to decrease the fuzz in the semantics. 
 
 
2.5. Individuals, history 
In classical logic an individual is anything to which we can assign properties. In 
classical positivist philosophy the semantics was primarily in terms of spatio-temporal 
connectedness, and usually also boundedness. With further abstraction, more objects 
took on the role of individuals  (e.g. functions in functional analysis, where in naïve 
set theory functions are a special type of relations). 
The increase in abstraction of our present day reasoning opens the way for a 
reappraisal of the term/concept. Such a reappraisal is necessarily context dependent, 
with different concepts of individual being “natural” in different contexts. 
 
3. Population dynamics 
 
3.1. Faithful reproduction and i-states 
In population dynamics theory the essential property characterising individuals is 
faithful reproduction. To make contact with observational reality this faithfulness 
should be interpreted in a relaxed manner, in that individuals are allowed over their 
lifetime to move through different developmental and physiological states, to be 
called i(nternal)-states, and potentially also to be born with different i-states. 
 
Thus the requirement is that it should be possible to delineate an i-state 
space and a space of environmental conditions such that the mechanism 
generating the i-state dynamics and behavioural output in dependence on 
the environment reproduces faithfully. 
 
 
3.2. Identifying the essentials 
The essential requirement that goes with the state concept is:  
 
Given its present state, the future of an individual is independent of the 
past. 
 
The essential requirement that goes with the concept of environment is: 
 
Given the environment, individuals behave independently and move 
independently through their state spaces. 
 
Corollary: Given the environment and given its birth state, an individual is 
independent of its parent(s). 
 
In view of their importance for all sort of arguments I propose  
 
for population dynamical purposes to take these independences to be the 
defining properties for the concept of individual. 
 
In this viewpoint the typical properties one tends to associate with the concept of 
individual like stability and spatiotemporal separation are possible causes of such 
independence, but should not be made part of the definition. The latter should be 
based on the structural essentials only. 
 
3.3. Microscopic versus macroscopic views 
The following two reaction schemes differ microscopically, but lead to the same 
equations in the large system size limit: 
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with a := n
A
/! , b := n
B
/! , !  the system size and n
X
 the density of X-individuals. 
Conditional on the environment (b for the A-individuals and a for the B-individuals) 
in the first scheme A- and B-individuals are dependent in their behaviour, in the 
second scheme this is not the case. For large systems this microscopic dependence 
becomes infinitely diluted. The ideas expressed in this note only apply to such large 
number limits, or to situations where the microscopic and macroscopic environment 
of individuals coincide (as when organisms interact through some continuous 
diffusible resource). 
 
Convention about the semantics:  
In the stochastic models one should allow for microscopic 
dependencies that are diluted out when the system is suitably scaled up. 
 
 
3.4. Other structures: h-states 
The previous formalisation only captures well-mixed populations. Spatial, social and 
other external structures can often be included by extending the i-states to 
h(eterogeneity)-states, where a h-state consists of an i-state plus some other 
changeable attribute, like location or position in a social hierarchy, that selects an 
individual‘s environmental input from the overall environment, which is then written 
as a function over the second component of the h-states. 
 
With such an extension the essential independence relations generalise 
unchanged to populations with external structure. 
 
 
3.5 Semantics 
The simplest real objects with a tendency to be approximately (conditionally) 
independent are bodies, recognisable by their spatio-temporal connectedness and 
boundedness. Most arguments start from bodies. I will therefore refer to bodies as 
primary individuals. 
Our usual focus on bodies reflects our subconscious pre-concepts. (The 
spatiotemporal connectedness and boundedness of bodies is only perceptual. On a 
finer level the molecules making up a body are in a state of constant flux.) 
I will call other constructs satisfying the required independence properties 
generalised individuals, or, when they can be seen as sets of bodies, meta-individuals 
(in analogy with the term meta-population). 
 
3.6. An unusual example of generalised individuals 
Imagine equally dividing single celled organisms with size (biomass) as i-state. 
Assume that cells can divide only when their size s is larger than  s1/2 := ½ smax. 
Except when division only occurs at a few fixed sizes, the set of birth states in this 
imaginary organism is a continuum. It now pays to take the composite of an 
individual passing through sizes > s1/2 and its two daughters passing through sizes < 
s1/2 as a generalised individual. This way we lessen the dependence between an 
individual and its parent, leading to simpler mathematical arguments.  
 
3.7. Meta-populations  
The classical example of meta-individuals are what are usually referred to as the 
constituting local populations of a meta-population. These meta-individuals are born 
when an empty patch is settled, and die when the local population goes extinct as a 
result of demographic stochasticity or a local catastrophe. In the simplest case the i-
state is the number of bodies in a patch. The environmental condition generally 
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consists of at least two variables: density of empty patches and immigration rate. The 
former co-determines the birth rate, the latter the so-called rescue effect. 
For general meta-population models the rescue effect only disappears when 
extinctions come only from catastrophes.  
Part of the semantics that goes with this concept of meta-population is that in 
the represented real populations 
 
• migration should directly connect relatively large numbers of patches, 
• there should be no environmental coupling between patches, other 
than  
  by the effects of migration. 
 
 
3.8. Context dependence 
The extent to which objects/constructs are dependent depends on the context. For 
example, the rescue effect disappears when we concentrate on initial growth of the 
meta-population. By extrapolation we may expect that some constructs can be 
considered generalized or meta-individuals in one context, but not in a different one. 
 
4. Micro-evolution 
 
4.1. Definition 
Changes in the genetic constitution of populations are referred to as micro-evolution.  
To fit genetics in the earlier framework the genetic constitution of a body 
should be incorporated as component of its i-state. 
 
4.2. Population genetics 
Only the simplest ecological scenarios allow decomposition into the standard 
population genetical equations combined with an ecologically based equation for the 
density of bodies. 
Another option is to consider bodies as communities of genes. (Only in 
principle, in practice the resulting formalism is horrible.) A single body then has to be 
counted more than one time, once for each gene copy. (Under random mating the 
microscopic dependence brought about by their being in a single body disappears in 
the large system size limit.) 
In the latter view the gene copies are the primary individuals, with the 
phenotype of a gene the map from all possible genetic backgrounds together with 
which it may find itself in a body, combined with all possible environments in which 
that body may find itself, to the trait vector measured on the resulting body.  
 
4.3 Fitness 
 
In population genetics fitness is traditionally equated to survival till 
reproduction times average adult offspring production. I will instead call 
the logarithm of this quantity fitness 
  
as this is the only way to compare models of many different provenances. 
This time honoured fitness concept works only for simple ecological scenarios, 
where the different life phases are both neatly separated and synchronised. Its 
advantage is that one can introduce fitnesses that vary over space and time. The other 
advantage of the population genetical simplification of ecology is that it becomes 
feasible to analyse the effects of complicated genetic architectures. 
 
5. Meso-evolution 
 
5.1 Definition 
I define meso-evolution here as 
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evolutionary changes in the values of traits of representative individuals 
and concomitant patterns of taxonomic diversification.  
 
(In other contexts meso-evolution has been called “long-term” evolution.) Introducing 
this term frees the term macro-evolution for really large scale changes like anatomical 
innovations, where one cannot even speak in terms of a fixed set of traits (c.f. Metz 
2011). 
 
5.2. The standard simplification 
Trait evolution tends to depend in interestingly complicated manners on the details of 
the ecology. Hence we cannot stick to the simple ecological scenarios from 
population genetics. Yet, some simplifications are needed to argue our way to results. 
The usual simplifying assumption in meso-evolutionary theory is that   
 
mutants can be considered one at a time.  
 
Unless stated otherwise, all the following statements are predicated on this 
assumption. 
 
5.3. ESS theory 
The theory of meso-evolutionary statics is called ESS theory. 
 
Definition: 
An Evolutionarily Steady Strategy is a (combination of) resident 
phenotype(s) that create an environment such that all other phenotypes 
that can arise through mutation cannot invade. 
 
ESS theory simplifies considerably if we assume that bodies reproduce clonally. 
Without that assumption we in principle  
 
• have to work with explicit genotype to phenotype maps, 
• have to account for genetic structures of any complicatedness.  
 
The natural question then is:  
 
When are the ESSes for models assuming clonally reproducing bodies the 
same as the ESSes for models that treat bodies as meta-individuals, 
constructed from genes as the primary individuals? 
 
 
5.4. Fitness 
An adequate fitness concept for meso-evolutionary considerations should correctly 
predict whether or not a mutant can invade, and also the overall speed of such an 
invasion, for as large as possible a collection of ecological scenarios (Metz et al 1992, 
Metz 2008).  
The basic concept can only be defined for clonally reproducing objects. The 
best possible extension to the sexual Mendelian case then can be made by mentally 
constructing clonally reproducing individuals with similar life histories, calculating 
reproductive output as the average rate of producing kids through the micro- and 
macro-gametic routes (first add and then divide by 2; see Metz and Leimar 2011, 
Gyllenberg et al. 2011).  
 
Invasion fitness:  
The fitness ρ(Y,E)  of a given type Y in a given ergodic environment  E 
can be defined as the (asymptotic, average) exponential growth rate of a 
(hypothetical) clone of individuals of that  type in that environment. 
For mutants the environment E is set by the population dynamics of the 
resident types. 
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(Note the implicit assumption that the resident population dynamics approaches an 
attractor generating an ergodic environment.) In the population genetical scenario this 
quantity equals the logarithm of the relative fitness of a heterozygote versus the 
resident homozygote from the population genetics textbooks. 
 
 
5.5. Some results 
 
Genetically monomorphic ESSes are correctly predicted from the fitness 
of bodies. 
 
(Heterozygote bodies reproduce effectively clonally by crossing with resident 
homozygotes.)  
Genetic constraints may preclude the extension of this result to genetically 
polymorphic ESSes. 
 
Example of a genetic constraint: For all environments the fitnesses of phenotypes are 
similarly ordered, and the fittest type can only be realised by heterozygotes.  
 
Ideal Free assumption: 
Mutants can occur that produce any feasible type as heterozygotes in the 
genetic backgrounds supplied by the resident population. 
 
Proposition: In the IF case also genetically polymorphic ESSes are correctly 
predicted. 
 
(The proof is only complete for the case of non-fluctuating environments and but a 
single h-state at birth. See e.g. Bulmer (1994), Metz et al (2008).)  
 
5.6. Evolutionary individuals 
In view of the preceding considerations, I propose the following concept of  
 
evolutionary individuals: 
objects for which one can define a fitness such that ESSes are correctly 
predicted. 
 
Bodies may be evolutionary individuals, but this is not always the case (thanks to the 
evolutionary coupling of bodies by genetic constraints). On the other hand, also other 
constructs may be considered individuals, like  
 
• family groups (with singles treated as families of size one),  
• patches in a structured meta-population, 
• pairs in (some) pair approximation calculations for a population  
  supposedly living on the nodes of a graph 
 
(c.f. Metz & Gyllenberg 2001, Gyllenberg & Metz 2001, Parvinen & Metz 2008, 
Metz 2008; Matsuda et al. 1992, van Baalen and Rand 1998, van Baalen 2000, Lion 
and van Baalen 2009). 
Note that some objects that cannot be considered population dynamical 
individuals might yet be evolutionary individuals, since the definition of fitness 
restricts the considered environments. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
6.1. Updating our intuition  
Some of the above considerations may feel counterintuitive, in particular the 
consequences of the proposal for the definition of evolutionary individuals. In a 
genetic polymorphism caused by heterozygote superiority the bodies under 
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consideration will not be considered evolutionary individuals. If the viewpoint is 
changed to a population dynamical one, the bodies are cut loose from the genetic 
network that keeps them in existence through the ploy of conditioning on their genetic 
birth state. In the meso-evolutionary context, however, the stress comes to lie on the 
fact that the homozygote types could never exist were it not for their genetic coupling 
to heterozygote forebears. Hence evolutionarily they cannot be considered in 
isolation.  
The essence of our naïve intuition about individuals also appears to be that they 
can be considered as independent entities in agreement with my scientifically 
motivated proposals, except that our intuition focuses on visible indicators and I on 
independence per se. (Think of the classical philosophical stress on having a 
multitude of within individual relations and but a few between individual ones.) In 
evolutionary arguments we on occasion cannot in our mental constructions get rid of 
all the connections between individuals, while in population dynamical ones we can. 
What objects are individuals, thus depends on the imposed context. However, such is 
the case with all concepts, only usually rather less blatantly. Where our intuition 
prefers similarity between contexts in our conceptual labelling of objects, I opted for 
enlarging the reach within each context of the arguments in which the concepts figure. 
 
6.2. How does all this help mathematical biology? 
The ideas that were described above form part of an informal lore among population 
modellers. Coming up with some generalized individuals somewhere hidden in the 
specification of a model can help considerably with its analysis. All I have done in the 
above essay is making this lore explicit in a slightly facetious manner.  
One example of the usefulness of this suite of ideas that I am well familiar with 
can be found in the introduction of the concept of Rm (the number of immigrants 
elsewhere produced by a newly established mutant colony in a very large collection of 
equally coupled patches possibly already populated by some resident types) by Metz 
and Gyllenberg (2001) and Gyllenberg and Metz (2001). Making the Rm idea explicit 
sparked of a, small, industry of eco-evolutionary modelling for meta-populations. 
However, Rm is nothing but the R0 (i.e., average life-time offspring production) of an 
appropriately defined kind of meta-individuals.  
Thinking in terms of generalised individuals may also resolve some 
controversies about the “diversity of R0s” appearing in epidemiology. To quote from 
one of the reviews Claus Rueffler and I received for our contribution to this special 
issue, “ …  it is known that there are many surrogate (biologically irrelevant) indices 
of R0 which can share the threshold property … “, to which we answered that these 
quantities are nothing but R0s of differently defined meta-individuals. As soon as it is 
specified what are “births”, R0 is uniquely determined. However, since the R0 of 
epidemiology is already the R0 of a meta-individual (to wit, the population of infective 
particles in the host body) akin to Rm, there actually often is little reason to fix on just 
that particular quantity. Moreover, the other quantities need not be all that irrelevant. 
Focussing on a particular type of meta-individual may give one a useful take on a 
particular epidemiological question. (Notwithstanding the somewhat curt reply we are 
grateful to that reviewer as her/his remark spurred us to prove that the R0–like fitness 
proxy Q introduced by Metz and Leimar (2011) is unique up to a multiplicative 
constant if we require that the proxy should be locally sign equivalent to ln(R0) and 
separately affine in the demographic parameters.) 
Another example in this area is the seeming clash between the R0-concepts for 
periodic environments introduced by Bacaër and Guernaoui  (2006) and by Cushing 
and Ackleh (2011) (see also Bacaër and Ait Dads, 2012). Basically Bacaër and 
Guernaoui consider ordinary births, with and extended birth state description also 
including the phase of the cycle at which individuals are born, whereas Cushing and 
Ackleh consider generalized individuals of their own making, the construction of 
10 
 
which, mathematically interesting though it may be, were it only for its 
unexpectedness, provides little in the way of inspiration for biological thought. 
As a final example consider the analysis of the eco-evolutionary model of Shaw 
and Levin (this issue). In that model one can construct a generalized individual by 
treating the return to state 1 as if it were a birth. A shortcut to the equilibrium equation 
is that at equilibrium the R0 of these generalized individuals should be 1. Moreover, at 
the ESS this R0 should be maximal, just as the real R0. The fact that the R0 of the 
generalized individuals is separately affine in the parameters considered to be under 
evolutionary control then makes for the relatively simple analysis of the properties of 
the ESS. 
The concept of evolutionary individuals as such provides little help for 
mathematical thinking. And even biologists may find it a strange beast. What its 
introduction does though, is lodge firmly in the mind the idea that if one has derived 
evolutionary conclusions from ecological considerations it is important to see under 
precisely which assumptions on the genetical and developmental architecture these 
conclusions survive the realism check of exposing them to a Mendelian world view.  
Although I introduced the concept of evolutionary individuals with my tongue 
rather close to my cheek, I yet believe it to be useful in that putting it forward brings 
home that the simple minded approach to evolution concentrating on the performance 
of bodies can sometimes fail due to the genealogical nexus time and again 
reconstructing unfit bodies. For population geneticists this is of course nothing new. 
Yet as a message it at times appears somewhat underappreciated in math biology 
circles. 
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